If I have a constitutional right to own property, and there is no tax legislation that can take away that right, then what loophole does the government use to make me pay to live on my own land and take it away by force if I don’t? Your lawyer and the government give you the wrong piece of paper, as these all unanimous decisions show.
WRIGHT v. MATTISON 18 HOW (1856)(9-0)
The courts have concurred, it is believed, without an exception, in defining “color of title” to be that which in appearance is title, but which in reality is no title. Yet a claim asserted under the provisions of such a deed is strictly a claim under color of title, hence, color of title, even under a void and worthless deed, has always been received as evidence that the person in possession claims adversely to all the world.
Color of title may be made through conveyances, or bonds, or contracts,
or bare possession under parol agreements. We can entertain no doubt in this case that the auditor’s deed to the purchaser at the tax sale is color of title in Woodward, in the true intent and meaning of the Statute, and without regard to its intrinsic worth as a title.
STONE v. UNITED STATES 69 U.S. (1865)(10-0)
A patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive as against
the government, and all claiming under junior patents or titles, until it
is set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal.
The patent is but evidence of a grant, and the officer who issues it acts
ministerially and not judically.
SANFORD v. SANFORD 139 U.S. (1891)(9-0)
In ejectment the question always is who has the legal title for the demanded premises, not who ought to have it. In such cases the patent of the government issued upon the direction of the land department is unassailable.
A Court of equity has jurisdiction in such a case to compel the transfer
to the plaintiff of property which, but for such fraud and misrepresentation, would have been awarded to him, and of which he was thereby
CHANDLER v. CALUMET & HECLA 149 U.S. (1893)(7-0)
It is well settled that the state could have impeached the title thus conveyed to the canal company only by a bill in chancery to cancel or annul it, either for fraud on the part of the grantee, or mistake or misconstruction of the law on the part of its officers in issuing the patent.
But whether there is any technical estoppel, in the ordinary sense, or not, it cannot be maintained that the state can issue two patents, at different dates to different parties, for the same land, so as to convey by the second patent a title superior to that acquired under the first patent. Neither can the second patentee, under such circumstances, in an action at law, be heard to impeach the prior patent for any fraud committed by the grantee against the state, or any mistake committed by its officers acting within the scope of their authority and having jurisdiction to act and to execute the conveyance sought to be impeached.
Neither the state nor its subsequent patentee is in a position to cancel or annul the title which it had authority to make, and which it had previously conveyed to the canal company.
SARGEANT v. HERRICK 221 U.S. (1911)(9-0)
It is apparent that the validity of the tax title depends upon the question whether the location of the warrant in 1857, without more, gave a right to a patent.
Among the conditions upon compliance with which such a right depends,
none has been deemed more essential than the payment of the purchase
price, which, in this instance, could have been made in money or by a
warrant like the one actually used.
UNITED STATES v. CREEK NATION 295 U.S. (1935)(9-0)
They were intended from their inception to effect a change of ownership
and were consummated by the issue of patents, the most accredited type of
conveyance known to our law.
SUMMA CORP v. CALIFORNIA STATE EX REL. LANDS COM’N 466 U.S. (1984)(8-0)
The final decree of the Board, or any patent issued under the Act, was also a conclusive adjudication of the rights of the claimant as against the United States, but not against the interests of third parties with superior titles.
Finally, in UNITED STATES v. CORONADO BEACH CO. 255 U.S. (1921) The Court expressly rejected the Government’s argument, holding that the patent proceedings were conclusive on this issue, and could not be collaterally attacked by the Government.
The necessary result of the Coronado Beach decision is that even “sovereign” claims such as those raised by the State of California in the present case must, like other claims, be asserted in the patent proceedings or be barred.
These decisions control the outcome of this case. We hold that California
cannot at this late date assert its public trust easement over petitioner’s property, when petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest had their interest confirmed without any mention of such an easement in proceedings taken pursuant to the Act of 1851. The interest claimed by California is one of such substantial magnitude that regardless of the fact that the claim is asserted by the State in its sovereign capacity, this interest, like the Indian claims made in BARKER and in UNITED STATES v. TITLE INS. & TRUST CO., must have been presented in the patent proceeding or be barred.